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The  Somatic  Marker  Hypothesis  (SMH)  posits  that  somatic  states  develop  and  guide  advantageous
decision  making  by “marking”  disadvantageous  options  (i.e., arousal  increases  when  poor  options  are
considered).  This  assumption  was  tested  using  the  standard  Iowa  Gambling  Task  (IGT)  in  which  partici-
pants  win/lose  money  by  selecting  among  four  decks  of cards,  and an  alternative  version,  identical  in both
structure  and payoffs,  but with  the aim changed  to lose  as much  money  as  possible.  This  “lose”  version
of the  IGT  reverses  which  decks  are  advantageous/disadvantageous;  and  so  reverses  which  decks  should
be  marked  by somatic  responses  – which  we  assessed  via  skin  conductance  (SC).  Participants  learned
to  pick  advantageously  in  the  original  (Win)  IGT and  in  the  (new)  Lose  IGT.  Using  multilevel  regression,
some  variability  in  anticipatory  SC  across  blocks  was  found  but no consistent  effect of  anticipatory  SC  on
disadvantageous  deck  selections.  Thus,  while  we  successfully  developed  a new  way  to  test  the  central
claims  of  the  SMH,  we  did  not  ﬁnd  consistent  support  for the  SMH.
© 2016  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article under  the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, &
Anderson, 1994) was devised in order to understand the decision
making deﬁcits shown by patients with damage to their ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC); in particular, their tendency to
repeat disadvantageous courses of action. The decrement in these
patients’ personal, ﬁnancial and social decision making following
their brain damage – despite intact intelligence, attention, memory
and language skills – led to the development of the Somatic Marker
Hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991; Damasio,
1994). Reﬂecting these patients’ difﬁculties expressing emotions,
and their altered physiological responses to emotional but not neu-
tral stimuli, Damasio hypothesized that the VMPFC played a role in
successful decision making (Damasio et al., 1991; Damasio, 1994).
The SMH  proposes that emotions we experience act as biasing sig-
nals (somatic markers; e.g., as assessed by skin conductance) that
help guide decision making. Poor outcomes elicit intense somatic
signals that ‘mark’ the course of action that led to those poor out-
comes. When this course of action is considered in a subsequent
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decision, the somatic signals are activated and so serve to reduce
the likelihood of repeating previous poor decisions.
The IGT requires participants to select from four decks of cards,
from which they either receive a monetary reward, or a combined
monetary reward and punishment (loss), which are revealed upon
selecting the card (see Table 1). Two  decks (termed “bad decks”)
offer high (“immediate”) rewards but large (“delayed”) punish-
ments. The other two  (“good”) decks offer lower (“immediate”)
rewards and smaller (“delayed”) punishments. To be successful at
the IGT, participants must learn to forgo large immediate gains in
order to avoid the larger delayed punishments. The structure of the
rewards and punishments is such that calculating the exact long-
run average outcomes of the decks was  presumed to be unlikely by
Bechara et al. (1994). Instead, participants must use more intuitive
decision making processes that, according to the SMH, are deter-
mined by emotional hunches that participants develop about the
decks when playing the task. Healthy control participants should
learn to select more from the good decks by the end of 100 selec-
tions. Patients with VMPFC damage, however, continually select
from the bad decks throughout the game (Bechara et al., 1994).
However, more recent research has shown the reward structure
is cognitively penetrable (Maia & McClelland, 2004) and while not
all healthy participants learn to select from the good decks, some
VMPFC patients have shown learning on the IGT (e.g., Fellows &
Farah, 2005).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2016.10.014
0301-0511/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Table  1
Reward and punishment structure of the IGT (original version; Bechara et al., 1994).
Deck (Type/Punishment frequency) Reward per card Number of losses per 10 cards Total Loss per 10 cards Net outcome per 10 cards
A (Bad/Frequent) 100 5 −1250 −250
B  (Bad/Infrequent) 100 1 −1250 −250
C  (Good/Frequent) 50 5 −250 250
D  (Good/Infrequent) 50 1 −250 250
Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, and Damasio (1996) hypothesized
that (“anticipatory”) somatic states arising prior to card selec-
tions differentiate between good and bad decks (thereby facilitating
advantageous selections). Results from skin conductance (SC) data
show that both control and patient groups have greater skin
conductance responses (SCR) after selecting a card containing a
punishment compared to a card containing a reward only – thereby
marking poorer outcomes with greater arousal. However, while
control participants develop elevated anticipatory SC in the few
seconds prior to selecting cards from bad decks, VMPFC patients do
not (Bechara et al., 1996).
However, ﬁndings for these “anticipatory skin conductance
responses” (aSCR) are not consistent. Bechara and Damasio (2002)
reported variance in the aSCRs of healthy participants who  were
poor performers in the IGT, with some developing anticipatory
markers as would be predicted but this did not facilitate advan-
tageous play, yet some studies ﬁnd elevated aSCRs only in the
highest performing sub-groups of participants (e.g., Carter & Smith
Pasqualini, 2004; Crone, Somsen, Van Beek, & Van der Molen,
2004). Crone et al.’s (2004) moderately performing group, showed
lower aSCRs but improvement in deck selections across the game;
indicating learning can take place in the absence of somatic mark-
ers. Another challenge comes from Suzuki, Hirota, Takasawa, and
Shigemasu (2003) who found no difference between anticipatory
SC on early and later trials – failing to provide support for anticipa-
tory markers developing as the game progresses and subsequently
guiding behaviour in the IGT.
The structure of the reward and punishment schedule – as dis-
tinct from each deck’s expected value (i.e., mean loss/gain) – has
been suggested as an alternative explanation for elevated aSCRs
found for bad decks. Modifying the good decks to have the higher
rewards and punishments (but still an overall net gain), Tomb,
Hauser, Deldin, and Caramazza (2002) found greater aSCRs prior
to selecting from good decks; the opposite of what the SMH  pre-
dicts. Tomb et al. (2002) suggested somatic markers were driven
by the immediate action being taken, rather than by longer-term
outcomes. Yen, Chou, Chung, and Chen (2012) modiﬁed the IGT to
test whether aSCRs were due to differences in expected value (EV)
or differences in the riskiness of the decks. They found that antic-
ipatory SC marked the preferred choices across different stages of
learning in the game; greater for the high-risk bad deck early on,
then greater for low-risk good deck later in the task. Chiu et al.
(2008) also adapted the IGT to create the Soochow gambling task:
the good and back decks had the same EVs as in the original IGT, but
punishments occurred on 4/5 cards in the good decks and only 1/5
times in the bad decks. Chiu et al. (2008) found that participants
chose more from the bad decks, suggesting that the frequency of
gains and losses took precedence over EV.
If conscious awareness of advantageous play can occur before
aSCRs develop, this would negate the need to use somatic states
to guide decision making. Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio
(1997) measured SCRs during the IGT but also assessed partici-
pants’ knowledge about the decks at points throughout the game
to determine when participants became aware of the best strat-
egy for advantageous play. The assessment of conscious knowledge
led Bechara et al. to describe four conceptual stages in the game:
‘pre-punishment’, ‘pre-hunch’, ‘hunch’ and ‘conceptual’ stage. They
concluded that, in healthy controls, covert somatic markers develop
in response to experienced outcomes and inﬂuence decisions, and
that this occurs prior to the generation of overt responses to such
outcomes.
Maia and McClelland (2004) examined participants’ knowledge
using Bechara et al.’s (1997) questions but posed additional more
detailed questions and found that participants had consciously
available knowledge, which enabled them to perform well, at
an earlier stage in the IGT than Bechara et al. (1997) reported.
Other studies have supported Maia and McClelland (e.g., Gutbrod
et al., 2006; Evans, Kemish, & Turnbull, 2004) but only Fernie and
Tunney (2013) replicated Maia and McClelland’s exact method –
using questions from Bechara et al. (1997) and from Maia and
McClelland’s (2004) – while additionally measuring SC. Fernie and
Tunney (2013) found no differences in aSCRs between the decks, or
between the question groups, prior to acquiring task knowledge.
Outcome SC following punishments was  larger for the disadvanta-
geous decks in the pre-knowledge period, but only for participants
who went on to display knowledge. The authors concluded that a
lack of conceptual knowledge together with a lack of differential
aSCRs does not hinder successful play in the IGT.
Maia and McClelland (2004) suggested the poor performance
of patients with VMPFC damage could be better explained by an
inability to carry out reversal learning by inhibiting the win-stay-
lose-shift strategy typical of many learning from feedback tasks
(Restle, 1958; Rolls, 2005) when experiencing a punishment in the
advantageous decks. To investigate this, Fellows and Farah (2005)
switched the IGT deck structure so that the disadvantageous decks
were no longer the better decks during the initial trials, and found
VMPFC damaged patients’ performance on the task equaled that of
healthy controls. However, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio
(2005) state that reversal learning is not the only requirement for
successful IGT performance; rather, a “stop signal” (which could
take the form of an emotional signal) would also need to develop.
Research from other experiential decision tasks (i.e., where
the participant receives feedback on their choices) highlights
that – even if participants successfully inhibit win-stay lose-shift
responses – they may  still have difﬁculty choosing well. The prin-
ciple “do what works best most of the time” is a good heuristic
for predicting patterns of choice in experiential tasks (Rakow &
Newell, 2010). For example, Yechiam, Rakow, and Newell (2015)
found that, even when decision makers are informed about each
option’s payoff distribution, disadvantageous options with a rare
but “catastrophic” outcome can be popular choices if the feed-
back one receives emphasizes that – on almost all occasions – this
delivers a better payoff than a (safe) option with higher EV. This
conforms to the patterns of preference observed for deck B in the
IGT from which nine in every ten cards yields a positive outcome:
Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann, and Wagenmakers’
(2013) report a preference for this low-frequency-of-punishment
bad deck over the good decks in most studies; and this “prominent
deck B phenomenon” has also been discussed by Lin, Chiu, Lee, and
Hsieh (2007) and Dunn, Dalgleish, and Lawrence (2006).
To further investigate the inﬂuence of the IGT’s EV and punish-
ment frequency on subsequent choices, and the development of
somatic markers, we created a lose version of the IGT, which sim-
ply reversed the original instruction from winning, to losing money.
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We  asked participants to play either the win IGT or our lose IGT. The
aim of the win IGT is to ﬁnd cards with gains, and minimize losses;
the aim of the lose version of the IGT is to ﬁnd cards with losses, and
to minimize gains. The contingencies of the decks were identical to
the original IGT in both versions but relative to the standard IGT,
this lose version of the IGT reverses which cards progress the par-
ticipant towards his/her goal, and which hinder. Thus, the “good”
decks in the original IGT (C & D) are now “bad” in the lose version
(because they deliver net gains); whereas the original bad decks (A
& B, which deliver net losses) become “good” when the goal is to
lose. The frequency of punishments is also switched for decks, with
Deck B and D becoming high frequency punishment decks in the
lose version and Deck A and C low frequency punishment decks,
providing an additional interesting examination of the Deck B phe-
nomenon. This lose version of the IGT allows us to further test the
SMH to examine whether somatic markers develop that help to
differentiate options which are conducive to your current goal from
those that are not whilst guarding against the threat of introducing
confounds by changing the task.
1.1. Hypotheses and analysis
We  retain the standard letter labels for the IGT decks (A–D),
which are deﬁned according to their payoff distributions (see
Table 1). The SMH  predicts that participants begin the IGT by select-
ing from all four decks (for a number of trials) and then:
H1a. In the original Win  version of the IGT, participants mainly
select decks C and D in the later trials.
H1b. In the new Lose version of the IGT, participants mainly select
decks A and B in the later trials.
However, if frequency of punishment drives preference, a dif-
ferent pattern of results is expected, which also varies between
the Win  and Lose versions because reversing the goal reverses the
rank-order for the frequency of disadvantageous cards in the decks.
These (partially) competing predictions are:
H2a. In the Win  version, participants prefer low-frequency loss
decks (B and D) to high-frequency loss decks (A and C).
H2b. In the Lose version, participants prefer high-frequency loss
decks (A and C) to low-frequency loss decks (B and D).
The SMH  predicts that, in response to outcomes experienced
from selecting the cards, outcome SC responses will develop, with
outcome SC greater for non-rewarded cards than for rewarded
cards. Therefore, the SMH  predicts that:
H3a. In the Win  version, cards containing a loss generate greater
outcome SC than those that contain only a gain.
H3b. In the Lose version, cards that contain only a gain generate
greater outcome SC than those that also contain a loss.
The SMH  predicts that participants (with no cognitive impair-
ment) develop anticipatory SC responses prior to picking from the
decks, which will be greater for the disadvantageous decks. The
SMH  therefore predicts that:
H4a. In the Win  version, later in the IGT, greater anticipatory SC
predicts selecting from decks A and B.
H4b. In the Lose version, later in the IGT, greater anticipatory SC
predicts selecting from decks C and D.
Previous studies examining SC in the IGT have examined
“successful” and “unsuccessful” participants (based on their task
performance) separately (e.g., Crone et al., 2004). In keeping with
this, and because the SMH  predicts that SC effects will be largest
for participants who were playing advantageously, we  will include
task performance as a predictor to determine whether this is the
case.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
There were 75 participants (54 female) with a mean (standard
deviation, SD) age of 20.46 (4.31) years and a range (interquar-
tile range; IQR) of 17–43 (18–21) years. Three participants were
removed for being non-responders (see procedure) and were
replaced to ensure equal cell sizes (N = 36 in each version of the
IGT). Participants were university students recruited from the Uni-
versity of Essex Psychology Department Volunteer list. Participants
received a performance-contingent payment of £0.50 for every
£1000 of task balance; plus a show-up fee of £5 (or course credit).
2.2. Apparatus
SC activity was recorded using the Mind Media NeXus-10, a
multi-channel physiological monitoring and feedback platform,
with a sampling rate of 32 samples per second, and employing
BioTrace+ software. In order to help control for individual differ-
ences in SC before the task (Figner & Murphy, 2011), a measure
of baseline activity was taken (duration calculated as a ratio of
1:5 of the average time taken to complete the task). SC activity
was recorded continuously throughout the task, and for critical
events in each task a trigger was sent from within the software
that controlled the study via a button box to mark the SC reading.
This enabled us to take timeframe windows of SC data around this
trigger. Standard analyses of SC data were then performed using
Ledalab, MatLab-based analysis software for SC data analysis using
Continuous Decomposition Analysis, with no downsampling of the
data (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010).
2.3. Materials and design
A computerized version of the original IGT (Bechara et al., 1999)
was programmed using REAL Studio. Participants chose repeatedly
(100 selections, number not speciﬁed in advance to the participant)
between four decks of cards by clicking on them. When a partici-
pant clicked on a card, the card displayed the amount of (notional)
money won  and (on some trials) lost. A green bar on the screen indi-
cated the amount of money won or lost by increasing or decreasing
in length; no values were shown but the original starting balance
of £2000 was represented by a red bar alongside the green bar to
show participants how well they were doing. The instructions were
slightly modiﬁed from the instructions given in the computerized
IGT (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999). The only aspect dif-
ferentiating the versions was  that participants in the Lose version
were instructed to lose (rather than to win) as much money as
possible.
The four decks (with images resembling playing cards) were
positioned in a single row, with deck locations randomized for each
participant. There were 80 cards in each deck (40 cards kept in the
original order, repeated twice) to help prevent decks running out.1
The font on the face of each “turned” card was red or black (40 of
each color per deck), sequenced as per the original IGT (Bechara
et al., 1994). A sound of a card turning played when the partici-
pant selected a card. Participants performed either the original Win
version or the Lose version in a between-subjects design.
1 This only occurred in the Lose version where 3 participants exhausted deck A
and 1 participant exhausted deck C in the last 20 trials of the task.
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2.4. Procedure
The study took about 30 min  to complete, and the entire ses-
sion lasted approximately 50 min. A consent form described the
“exchange rate” (i.e., notional-earnings-to-actual-payment) and
the NeXus-10 equipment. Once consent was obtained, participants
cleaned the palm side of their ﬁrst and third ﬁngertips of their non-
dominant hand with an alcohol wipe and the experimenter applied
EEG paste. The experimenter then attached the electrodes to the
distal phalange of the participant’s ﬁrst and third digits, who  then
placed their hand palm upwards on a cushion on the desk to keep
it as still as possible throughout the experiment. As recommended,
the sensors were given ﬁve minutes to settle and participants were
asked to take a deep breath to determine if the participant showed
a response in the SC signal (Figner & Murphy, 2011). They read the
instructions for either the Win  or Lose IGT during this time.
Participants selected from among the four decks (see Table 1)
by clicking their chosen deck with the computer mouse, using their
dominant (preferred) hand. Each card displayed the outcome for
ten seconds, then all the cards were enabled again and the back of
the cards were shown for each deck. There was no time limit for
participants to make their card selections. Upon completion, the
accrued balance appeared on the screen.
2.5. Measures and data analyses techniques
The measure of SC reported here was the mean phasic driver
within the response window, which is the most accurate represen-
tation of phasic activity. The window of SC data used for outcome
SC was 1 to 4 s following a trial outcome (a card being selected)
during which the card outcome was displayed on screen. The win-
dow for SC data used for anticipatory SC was the 3 s prior to the trial
outcome (a card being selected). These timeframes were exported
from Ledalab for each trial for all participants.
Due to the repeated-measurement of SC and card selections
across trials, regressions were run using a multilevel model. Multi-
level models are used to assess data that contain a natural hierarchy
or clustering of cases within variables. This is appropriate with the
current data because the 100 card selections represent a cluster of
observations for each participant.2 This technique allows examina-
tion of trial-by-trial data in a principled fashion (e.g., by not treating
trials as if they were independent observations). Analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) is primarily used to assess the physiological data
from the IGT in previous studies; comparing mean outcome SC,
or mean anticipatory SC, between the four decks – often, but not
always, across a series of 20-trial blocks. This creates problems (see
Dunn et al., 2006) because data are missing when participants fail
to select from a deck in a given block (as, indeed, should be so if
participants have learned to avoid bad decks). This creates unequal
cell sizes, which is usually resolved (for these within-subjects data)
by eliminating those participants’ data, thus reducing statistical
power. Therefore, we did not use ANOVA to analyse the SC data
because it would require removing participants from the analy-
sis and because we believe that multi-level regression is a better
way to analyse these data (a view explicitly endorsed by one of our
reviewers).
Research has shown both inter- and intra-individual variability
in the rise and recovery time of SCRs (Breault & Ducharme, 1993;
Edelberg & Muller, 1981). The anticipated variation between partic-
ipants in SC (Figner & Murphy, 2011) was accounted for by entering
2 Multilevel models differ from standard regression models (e.g., Ordinary Least
Squares) due to dividing the error variance into separate components. This allows
the model to control for the patterns of the structured data: patterns in the error
from the model are assumed to have a reliable structure and are not just noise.
participant as a level 2 random intercept within the multilevel
model. Multilevel modeling was utilized in order to distinguish
within- and between- participant variations in SC (Goldstein, 1995;
Hox, 2010). If SC was entered as a predictor in the ﬁxed part of
the model, we also included it at level 1 as a random slope in the
random part of the model to account for within participant vari-
ability, in addition to participant as a level 2 random intercept.
The level 1 variables were at the individual trial level (100 data
points in this study) and included participants’ card selections (e.g.,
which deck picked, advantageous/disadvantageous selection) and
SC measures (outcome SC; anticipatory SC). We  checked for outliers
using the Blocked Adaptive Computationally-efﬁcient Outlier Nom-
inator (BACON; Billor, Hadi, & Velleman, 2000) procedure, which
identiﬁes multivariate outliers in a set of predictor variables, and
removed those outliers from all regression analyses.
3. Results
3.1. Deck selections
To examine the prediction that participants will initially explore
and pick from all decks before shifting to exploit the advanta-
geous decks by the end of the task (H1a,1b), we  ran a 5 (Block:
100 card selections split into 5 blocks of 20) × 4 (Deck: A, B,
C, D) × 2 (Version: Win, Lose) ANOVA with card selections from
each of the decks as the dependent variable. Where Mauchly’s
test showed that the assumption of sphericity had been violated,
the p-value was  adjusted following the procedure suggested by
Greenhouse-Geisser (likewise in all future analyses). All post hoc
comparisons were Tukey. There was a signiﬁcant three way inter-
action between Deck, Block and Version of IGT, F(12, 840) = 14.62,
p < 0.001, p2 = 0.173, so two separate 5 (Block) × 4 (Deck: A, B, C,
D) ANOVAs were run for each version.
In the Win  version there was a signiﬁcant interaction between
Block and Deck, F(5, 196) = 6.35, p < 0.001, p2 = 0.154, see Fig. 1.
Over the course of the game, as predicted by the SMH, the two
disadvantageous decks (A and B) were selected less, while selec-
tions of the two  advantageous decks (C and D) increased. Over
the ﬁrst 20 trials, disadvantageous deck B had the most selections.
Comparing the selection of disadvantageous deck B and the other
disadvantageous deck A (the 3rd most frequently selected) at block
1, revealed a signiﬁcant difference, F(1, 35) = 14.04, p < 0.001, with
participants preferring the low-frequency-of-loss disadvantageous
deck to the high-frequency-of-loss disadvantageous deck. Com-
paring disadvantageous deck B to the two  advantageous decks C
and D combined at block 1, revealed deck B was picked signif-
icantly more than the two advantageous decks, F(1, 35) = 13.67,
p < 0.001. Examining these comparisons at the end of the game
in block 5 revealed that the two advantageous decks were now
selected signiﬁcantly more compared to the disadvantageous deck
B, F(1,35) = 7.68, p = 0.009. After 100 trials, disadvantageous deck
B was not picked more than the other bad deck A, F(1,35) = 1.86,
p = 0.182, indicating no preference for the low-frequency-of-loss
disadvantageous deck B over the high-frequency-of-loss disadvan-
tageous deck A. There was no difference in the selection between
the high-frequency-of-loss advantageous deck C and the low-
frequency-of-loss advantageous deck D at the end of the game in
block 5, F < 1.
In the Lose version there was  a signiﬁcant interaction between
Block and Deck, F(6, 212) = 13.86, p < 0.001, p2 = 0.284, see Fig. 2.
Initially the disadvantageous decks (C & D) were selected more
frequently than the advantageous decks (A & B). In block 1,
the preferred deck, disadvantageous deck C (MDeckC = 6.69), was
picked signiﬁcantly more than the least-preferred deck, advanta-
geous deck B (MDeckB = 3.78), F(1, 35) = 20.04, p < 0.001. By block 5,
290 R.J. Wright et al. / Biological Psychology 123 (2017) 286–293
Fig. 1. Mean frequency of selection of the decks (A–D) over the 100 trials (5 blocks of 20 trials) for the Win  version with error bars representing standard error of the means.
Fig. 2. Mean frequency of selection of the decks (A–D) over the 100 trials (5 blocks of 20 trials) for the Lose version with error bars representing standard error of the means.
advantageous deck A was picked signiﬁcantly more than the other
advantageous deck B, F(1, 35) = 24.61, p < 0.001. There was  no dif-
ference between the selection of advantageous deck B and the
two disadvantageous decks (C & D) combined, F < 1. Participants
were picking the advantageous deck A (MDeckA = 10.81) signiﬁ-
cantly more than the other decks by the end of the game. The
advantageous deck B (MDeckB = 3.10) was picked equally to the two
disadvantageous decks. Disadvantageous deck C (MDeckC = 4.14)
was picked signiﬁcantly more than the disadvantageous deck
D (MDeckD = 2.00) in the ﬁnal block of the game (block 5), F(1,
35) = 11.61, p = 0.002.
An additional ANOVA examined the difference between total
number of cards selected from the disadvantageous decks
subtracted from the total number of cards selected from the advan-
tageous decks by Block and by Version (Win, Lose). This revealed a
large and signiﬁcant main effect of Block, F(4, 280) = 32.61, p < 0.001,
p2 = 0.318 reﬂecting a progressive improvement in task perfor-
mance over blocks. There was a tendency for more advantageous
selections in the Lose version than in the Win  Version but this was
not signiﬁcant (F < 1).
3.2. Multilevel modelling
To examine H3a and H3b we regressed Outcome SC (log10 trans-
formed) on Reward Type (rewarded = 0, non-rewarded = 1), Version
(Win, Lose), Block (dummy  coded with block 1 as the reference cat-
egory) and their interactions. There was a signiﬁcant three way
interaction between Reward Type, Version and Block, b = −0.07,
z = −4.59, p < 0.001, so we examined Outcome SC separately for
each Version. In the Win  version there was no effect of Reward
Type (z = −1.45, p =0.148). Therefore we found no support for H3a
that Outcome SC should be greater following a non-rewarded card
than a rewarded card in the Win  IGT. There was  a main effect
of Block with Outcome SC decreasing across the game, (Block2:
b = −0.27, z = −8.82, p < 0.001; Block3: b = −0.27, z = −8.76, p < 0.001;
Block4: b = −0.26, z = −8.11, p < 0.001; Block5: b = −0.19, z = −5.67,
p < 0.001). The interaction between Reward Type and Block was
not signiﬁcant (z = 0.01, p = 0.546). In the Lose version there was
an effect of Reward Type, b = 0.11, z = 2.26, p = 0.024. Therefore we
found support for H3b that Outcome SC should be greater follow-
ing a non-rewarded card than a rewarded card in the Lose IGT.
There was a main effect of Block with Outcome SC decreasing across
the game, (Block2: b = −0.27, z = −7.95, p < 0.001; Block3: b = −0.34,
z = −8.89, p < 0.001; Block4: b = −0.26, z = −5.89, p < 0.001; Block5:
b = −0.23, z = −4.60, p < 0.001). The interaction between Reward
Type and Block was  also signiﬁcant, b = −0.03, z = −2.33, p = 0.020;
Outcome SC was  higher following a non-rewarded card than a
rewarded card initially, in line with H3b but only for the ﬁrst two
blocks of the game, see Fig. 3, and then was  higher for rewarded
cards until the end of the task. When we included Task Performance
(successful participants were those who ended the task with more
than £2000 in the Win  IGT and less than £2000 in the Lose IGT) in
the above regressions it did not change the pattern of results found
and was  not a signiﬁcant predictor.
To examine H4a and H4b a multilevel logistic regression was run
to see whether disadvantageous selections (0 = good decks (Deck A
and B in Lose IGT, deck C and D in Win  IGT); 1 = bad (Deck C and
D in Lose IGT, deck A and B in Win  IGT)) could be predicted from
Anticipatory SC. Anticipatory SC was entered at level 1 and partic-
ipant at level 2. We  initially regressed Anticipatory SC for that trial
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Fig. 3. Log Outcome SC (Siemens/second) for rewarded cards and non-rewarded cards across the 100 trials (5 blocks of 20 cards) for the Lose version of the IGT, with error
bars  reﬂecting standard error of the mean (constant of 2 added).
Fig. 4. Log Anticipatory SC (Siemens/second) for advantageous and disadvantageous picks across the 5 blocks (of 20 cards) collapsed across both versions of the IGT, with
error  bars reﬂecting standard error of the mean (constant of 2 added).
(centered) on disadvantageous selection but found no signiﬁcant
effect, Odds Ratio = 0.95, z = −0.51, p = 0.610. To check for any effect
of Version, we regressed disadvantageous selection on Version,
together with Anticipatory SC and its interaction with Version (Win,
Lose). The main effect of Anticipatory SC remained a non-signiﬁcant
predictor, Odds Ratios = 1.00, z = 0.02, p = 0.986. The interaction
term for Anticipatory SC with Version was also not signiﬁcant, Odds
Ratio = 0.89, z = −0.56, p = 0.573. We  then included Block (dummy
coded with block 1 as the reference category) and its interaction
with Anticipatory SC (centered) to control for the time point in the
task, whilst retaining Version, Anticipatory SC and their interaction.
The main effect of Block was signiﬁcant; for each of blocks 2 through
5, the chances of picking disadvantageously were substantially
lower than those for block 1 (Block2: Odds Ratio = 0.54, z = −7.55,
p < 0.001; Block3: Odds Ratio = 0.34, z = −12.88, p < 0.001; Block4:
Odds Ratio = 0.27, z = −15.22, p < 0.001; Block5: Odds Ratio = 0.27,
z = −15.23, p < 0.001). The interaction between Anticipatory SC with
Block showed signiﬁcant differences between block 1 (base) with
block 3 (Odds Ratio = 0.62, z = −2.43, p = 0.015) and block 5 (Odds
Ratio = 0.66, z = −2.18, p = 0.029), see Fig. 4. The presence of a signif-
icant Block by Anticipatory SC interaction indicates some variability
in the regression coefﬁcients for anticipatory SC across blocks,
however not reliable enough to suggest a consistent effect of antic-
ipatory SC on disadvantageous deck selections as predicted in H4a
and H4b. Speciﬁcally, further analysis of each block individually
Table 2
Support for hypotheses.
H1a/H1b: H2a/H2b: H3a/H3b: H4a/H4b:
Win  IGT
√ √
partial x x
Lose IGT
√
partial
√
partial
√
partial x
indicated that only in block 4 did a positive effect of anticipatory
SC on disadvantageous selections approach signiﬁcance (p = 0.054).
This was further qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction between
anticipatory SC and version (p = 0.019) reﬂecting that only in the
Win  version was anticipatory SC positively related to deck selec-
tions. We  again included Task Performance as a predictor at each
step in the above analyses, however it did not change the pattern
of results and was never a signiﬁcant predictor itself.
4. Discussion
The support for our study hypotheses is summarized in Table 2.
We ﬁnd that, irrespective of whether participants are asked to win,
or to lose, they successfully learn (over the course of the IGT) to
pick more from those decks that are advantageous to their goal.
Notably, however, while in the (original) Win  version, participants’
ﬁnal preferences favoured both advantageous decks (C and D) to
a similar degree, in the Lose version it was the net loss deck with
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the high frequency of losses (deck A) that drove advantageous play.
A preference for the low frequency of loss deck (B) is common in
the original (Win) version of the IGT (Steingroever et al., 2013),
which we also ﬁnd – though only in the initial trials. The punish-
ment schedule in deck B is such that participants do not experience
a loss until card 9 and then again until card 14 so it is not surprising
the initial preference is such. If participants do not always easily
learn that deck B is “bad” in IGT studies, it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that our participants fail to identify this as a good choice when
the goal reverses (in the lose IGT) and they “should” select it. How-
ever, the patterns of deck-preference do not simply reverse when
the goal is reversed. We  argue that this points to the importance of
considering the frequency of losses and gains, not just the expected
value (EV) of options in the IGT (as assumed by the SMH). Three
lines of research support this interpretation: (1) studies that have
adapted the IGT payoff structures; (2) research using “decision-
from-experience” tasks in which – like the IGT – one learns from
previous choices; and (3) research on how biased samples affect
exploration (i.e., sampling) of the environment.
One example of the ﬁrst line of evidence comes from stud-
ies that adapted the EV in the IGT such as Chiu et al. (2008) and
Yen et al. (2012); these studies showed the importance of the fre-
quency of wins and losses on deck selections. Second, research
from other experiential decision tasks which ﬁnds that the prin-
ciple “do what works best most of the time” is a good heuristic for
predicting patterns of choice (Rakow & Newell, 2010). Thus, choos-
ing a high-frequency over a low-frequency “punishment” deck (i.e.,
deck A over B) when trying to lose is compatible with choosing the
action most likely to progress one’s goal, even though – on average
– decks A and B are equally “good” when trying to lose. Likewise,
in the standard (Win) IGT, deck B delivers the best possible out-
come 90% of the time – which presumably explains the comparative
attractiveness to this disadvantageous option early on in the task
as the ﬁrst punishment is not experienced until the 9th card in
the ﬁxed punishment schedule. Third, the developing pattern of
deck-preferences that we observed can also be understood from a
sampling perspective. Denrell (2005) identiﬁes an intriguing asym-
metry that arises when sampling information is costly (as in the IGT,
where turning a card to learn more about a deck risks forgoing a
better option). If an option initially appears good, people will keep
selecting it, though if initial outcomes are better than the long-
run average for that option they will eventually learn to disfavor
that option. In contrast, if an option initially appears bad, people
will stop selecting it, and so forgo the opportunity to learn that the
option is, on average, better than they initially experienced. This
is termed the “hot stove effect” (Denrell & March 2001), following
an anecdote from Mark Twain who observed that a cat need only
sit once on a hot stove for it to never to do so again, but it will
consequently never learn that most of the time the stove is a per-
fectly decent place to rest. In the standard (Win) IGT, Deck B is like
Twain’s “stove” – most of the time it is a good option, but getting
“badly burned” once or twice teaches you not to go there (Fig. 1). In
the Lose IGT, Deck B contains “rare treasures” (Teodorescu & Erev,
2014) – if you don’t persevere, you will never know what bounty
awaits you (Fig. 2). This neatly explains the patterns of preference
we observe for deck B in the ﬁrst block of trials from which the ﬁrst
eight picks deliver gains before occasional very large losses begin
to appear. Thus, in the Win  version it is initially attractive, though
participants persist long enough with it to learn that they should
resist selecting it. In contrast, deck B is initially unattractive in our
Lose IGT, and few participants persist with selections long enough
to learn that it is advantageous to their goal.
The SMH  predicts SCRs will develop after experiencing the out-
comes of the decks. We  ﬁnd that experiencing a non-rewarded card
predicted greater outcome SC but only in the Lose version. The inter-
action between block and reward type found higher outcome SC to
the non-rewarded cards (as predicted by the SMH) but only in the
ﬁrst 40 trials of the task. So it seems there is some support that out-
come SC does differentiate between outcomes, marking those that
are not conducive with your current goal with higher SC; however
even when this difference is found it does not persist throughout
the entire 100 trials of the game and was  not evident in the Win
IGT. Bechara et al. (1997) did not report outcome SC in their ﬁnd-
ings and so comparisons cannot be made with their previous work;
and, also, it is not clear from the SMH  whether differences in out-
come SC should persist throughout the task at a similar magnitude
or, rather, should decrease over time. However, Fernie and Tunney
(2013) reported that outcome SC following rewards was  higher
for participants who  displayed knowledge, and that outcome SC
reduced for advantageous decks in the trials after participants dis-
played knowledge. This suggests knowledge inﬂuences outcome
SC and our drop in outcome SC may  reﬂect the point at which our
participants were becoming knowledgeable in the Lose IGT.
We did not ﬁnd that greater anticipatory SC predicted select-
ing from disadvantageous decks (for both the Win  and the Lose
versions). Controlling for version, the interaction between antic-
ipatory SC and block suggests that anticipatory SC varies across the
IGT but does not have a consistent impact on selections. We did
not expect anticipatory SC to aid selections early on in the task but
it is difﬁcult to know exactly where the “sweet spot” lies, where
there should be a relationship between selections and anticipatory
SC. We  did not assess conscious knowledge in our study, which has
been used to distinguish different levels of understanding experi-
enced by participants in the IGT. In Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio
(2000), anticipatory SC developed and was  signiﬁcantly higher
prior to selecting disadvantageous decks in the “pre-hunch phase”
(where participants could not articulate a successful strategy) and
this difference remained until the end of the game, even once (pre-
sumed) conceptual understanding of the game was  acquired (and
presumably somatic markers are no longer needed to guide deci-
sions).
A more crude assessment of participants’ awareness of success-
ful play in the task is to examine whether participants ended the
game as winners (or losers). This may  miss out participants who
grasp the concept too late in the game to recover previous losses
(or gains), however we  found no beneﬁcial effect of SC for those
who performed better in the task, unlike in previous studies (e.g.,
Crone et al., 2004). In sum, the predictions of the SMH  regarding
the development of outcome and anticipatory SC were not reli-
ably supported in either the Win  IGT, or our Lose IGT, where the
predictions regarding SC were sometimes found to reverse. This
suggests that advantageous play in both versions of the IGT can
occur in the absence of somatic markers. However, as found in other
IGT studies (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2002), there was considerable
inter-individual variation in performance: 19/36 Win-version par-
ticipants ﬁnished “up” or “even” on their starting balance, and 21/36
Lose-version participants ﬁnished the game with less than the origi-
nal endowment (as per their goal). There is therefore a considerable
portion of participants who  did not master the IGT quickly enough
to ﬁnish “better off” than they started. Others have also reported
that a sub group of their (healthy) participants perform poorly in
the IGT, which they attribute to participants using one of a num-
ber of different strategies (e.g., Crone et al., 2004); and so analyses
have also been split into those who win versus those who  lose, or
ranges of performance. Typically these report that poor performers
show no anticipatory SC, or high variability in anticipatory SC (e.g.,
Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Carter & Smith Pasquilini, 2004; Crone
et al., 2004). However, when we included performance as a factor,
we failed to ﬁnd any difference in SC across both our successful and
unsuccessful performers – and found no moderating effects of task
performance (such as those expected if only successful participants
develop somatic markers that subsequently guide their choices).
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More recently, Overman and Pierce (2013) reviewed the impact
of real versus virtual versions of the IGT on Performance, and
other factors such as the impact of gender on card selections. The
real/virtual IGT devised by Overman and colleagues required par-
ticipants to select from real decks of cards, which were then also
represented virtually on a computer in front of them. This task
removes the possibility of participants questioning whether the
decks and cards interact, and performance has been shown to
increase with selections of advantageous cards reaching 70–80%
(depending on the number of trials administered) (e.g., Overman
et al., 2004, 2006). The use of a purely virtual IGT may  explain the
low rates of successful performance in both the Win  and Lose IGT
in the current study. Overman and Pierce (2013) also found that
women show a preference for the high frequency of reward decks,
Deck B and D, and ruled out differences in mathematical ability,
hormones and response perservation. This gender difference may
explain the Deck B preference seen in other research and evident
in our Win  IGT in the early blocks, with 24 females playing this ver-
sion out of the 36 participants. It may  also explain the preference of
Deck A in the lose IGT, where females may  drive the preference for
a high frequency of punishment deck when trying to lose. Further
examination of gender on performance in the Lose IGT would help
shed further light on the deck selections.
In this paper, we compared the standard IGT against a novel
adaptation of the IGT that reversed the predictions that the SMH
makes for the task, thereby facilitating novel tests of the SMH. Par-
ticipants were, in general, able to learn to succeed in either version
of the task, with their pattern of deck selections strongly suggest-
ing that the frequency of losses and gains (as distinct from EV) is
critical to predicting how participants will perform in such tasks.
While we observed elevated SC in response to bad outcomes, this
only occurred early on in the initial card selections in our new Lose
IGT. We  did not ﬁnd consistent support for the development of
anticipatory SC or their ability to guide advantageous play – a key
assumption of the SMH. This, despite using more powerful methods
of analysis than is typically used for the IGT.
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